Message Text

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ACTION AF-06

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O 011730Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3140

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FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVIS, AF FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (DAVIS, NATHANIEL) PFOR, IV

SUBJECT: ISSUES THAT MAY ARISE DURING ASST SECY DAVIS' VISIT TO IVORY COAST

1. SUMMARY: TO ASSIST ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVIS IN PREPARING FOR VISIT TO IVORY COAST, MAY 12-14, THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIES MAJOR KNOWN POSITIONS OF PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF IVORY COAST ON ISSUES THAT MIGHT ARISE. IT ALSO GIVES SUGGESTED COMMENTS ON CERTAIN OF THESE, AS WELL AS ON ISSUES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN AT THIS TIME TO USG AND AMEMBASSY EMBASSY. END SUMMARY.

2. IN THE COURSE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVIS' FORTHCOMING VISIT TO ABIDJAN. MAY 12-14. HE WILL BE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FELIX HOUPHOUET-

BOIGNY, FOREIGN MINISTER ARSENE USHER ASSOUAN AND OTHER MINISTERS. ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S TOUR D'HORIZON OF FOREIGN POLICY WITH THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE ON APRIL 26 AND CONSIDERING VARIOUS OTHER MAJOR ISSUES THAT HAVE ARISEN HERE OR ARE LIKELY TO IN THE COMING WEEKS, THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE AIMS AT SUMMARIZING IVORIAN POSITIONS IN THE EVENT THAT THE DEPARTMENT AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY WISHES TO

DEAL WITH THEM DURING THE LATTER'S VISIT. WHERE APPROPRIATE, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PROVIDE SUGGESTED RESPONSES.

- 3. PEACE: PEACE IN AFRICA, ACCORDING TO HOUPHOUET, REQUIRES THREE CONDITIONS: DOMESTIC PEACE IN EACH COUNTRY; PEACE AMONG ALL RPT ALL AFRICAN COUNTRIES; PEACE ON OTHER CONTINENTS. PEACE AT HOME REQUIRES LIBERTY, SOCIAL JUSTICE. PEACE IN AFRICA REQUIRES ACCEPTANCE OF ALL NEIGHBORS, NOT JUST FELLOW BLACK AFRICANS, BUT THE ARABS IN THE NORTH(WHO IMPOSED THEMSELVES ON AFRICA MANY CENTURIES AGO AND BECAME AFRICAN) AND THE WHITES IN THE SOUTH (WHO CAME IN THREE CENTURIES AGO AND ARE NOW ALSO AFRICAN). PEACE ON OTHER CONTINENTS AFFECTS US, TOO, AS EGYPTIANS BECOME INVOLVED IN WAR WITH ISRAEL, AND AS PROBLEMS IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA DIMINISH THE CAPACITY OF DEVELOPMED NATIONS TO HELP US WITH FINANCE AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. AFRICA SHOULD REMAIN ABSOLUTELY NEUTRAL AS REGARDS STRUGGLES ON OTHER CONTINENTS.
- 4. DIALOGUE: DIALOGUE IS HOUPHOUET'S ALTERNATIVE TO FORCE FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS. IT IS HARDER TO MAKE PEACE THAN TO MAKE WAR, BUT THIS IS IVORIAN OBJECTIVE. WHEN HOUPHOUET CHOSE DIALOGUE FOUR YEARS AGO, HE WAS ALONE AND ISOLATED, BUT NO ONE PROVED HIM WRONG. NOW HE IS NO LONGER ALONE. THE ALTERNATIVE TO DIALOGUE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA IS A SEVERE STRUGGLE AND INTERVENTION BY USSR AND PRC, BECAUSE (A) THE WEST WON'T SELL ARMS TO BLACK AFRICA FOR SUCH A STRUGGLE; (B) BUT SOUTH AFRICA IS STRONG AND HAS MODERN ARMS; (C) THUS THE BLACK AFRICANS WOULD HAVE TO TURN TO USSR AND PRC; (D) THE BLACK AFRICANS WOULD NEVER EXTRICATE THEMSELVES.
- 5. RESULTS OF DIALOGUE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: AFTER TWENTY YEARS OF UN RESOLUTIONS, WALDHEIM WAS INSTRUCTED TO NEGOTIATE WITH VORSTER. WHEN HE GOT VORSTER TO PROPOSE INDEPENDENCE IN TEN YEARS, UN NAMIBIA COMMISSION TERMINATED HIS MANDATE. IVORY COAST THEN TOOK UP DIALOGUE WITH VORSTER AND HE PROMISTED INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA IN FIVE YEARS. NOW IT IS UP TO BLACK AFRICANS IN NAMIBIA TO CARRY ON THAT DIALOGUE AND ACHIVE INDEPENDENCE. HOUPHOUET ALSO BELIEVES THAT HIS AND OTHERS' DIALOGUE EFFORTS HAVE PRODUCED REDUCTIONS IN PETTY APARTHEID. HE FAVORS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BY MANY BLACK AFRICANS WITH SOUTH AFRICA SO AS TO HAVE MORE BLACK DIPLOMATS IN PRETORIA AND CAPETOWN, MIXING WITH WHITES; MALAWIAN SHOULD NOT BE LEFT ISOLATED. IVORY COAST WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, REGARDLESS OF WHAT OAU SAYS.SUGGESTED RESPONSE BY ASST. SEC. DAVIS: WE, TOO, FAVOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND AGREE THAT PEACE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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IN AFRICA IS INDIVISIBLE. WE COMMEND PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET FOR HIS COURAGE AND DETERMINATION. PRESIDENT FORD HAS JUST RECEIVED PRESIDENT KAUNDA AND PRAISED HIS EFFORTS AT PEACE-MAKING. AT SAME TIME, WE ARE STRONGLY URGING MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA, INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA AND AN END TO APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA.

6. MIDDLE EAST: KEY TO PEACE IS ESTABLISHEMENT OF SEPARATE STATE FOR PALESTINIANS, ARABS AND CHRISTIANS, TOGETHER WITH FIRM GUARANTEES

OF BORDERS OF BOTH ISRAEL AND THAT STATE. ALTHOUGH STILL A STAUNCH SUPPORTER OF ISRAEL HOUPHOUET BELIEVES IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO HAVE PALESTINIANS INCORPORATED IN JORDAN AND EGYPT; THEY HAVE RIGHT TO OWN NATION. BUT HOUPHOUET FEARS THAT USSR DOES NOT REALLY WANT PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST, BECAUSE PRESENT UNREST ASSURES THEIR ACCESS TO MEDITERRANEAN AND TO RED SEA, AN HISTORIC RUSSIAN AMBITION. WEST'S CRITICAL MISTAKE WAS NOT TO BUILD ASWAN DAM AND LEAVE IT TO USSR. PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST WOULD TURN ARABS AGAINST USSR AGAIN, BECAUSE THEY ARE FUNDAMENTALLY ANTI-SOCIALIST AND ANTI-COMMUNIST.SUGGESTED RESPONSE BY ASST. SEC.DAVIS: WE WELCOME PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET'S VIEWS AND WILL SHARE THEM WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER. THE PRESIDENT'S WISDOM AND OBJECTIVITY MAY BE USEFUL TO THE PURSUIT OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

7. SOUTHEAST ASIA: HOUPHOUET FEARS THAT FALL OF CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM WILL LEAD TO FALL OF SOUTH KOREA, THAILAND AND EVEN INDIA TO COMMUNISTS. THE WEST, NOT THE UNITED STATES, LET SOUTHEAST ASIA DOWN. THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954, IF ENFORCED, WOULD HAVE BEEN ENOUGH, BUT THE WEST DID NOT LIVE UP TO GUARANTEES, WHILE NORTH VIETNAMESE MOVED INTO SOUTH. THE WEST AWAKENED LATE AND, EXCEPT FOR THE U.S., HALF-HEARTEDLY. AT THE END, ONLY THE U.S. WAS INVOLVED AND EVEN ITS SUPPORT FADED.

8. THREAT OF USSR AND PRC: HOUPHOUET'S OBJECTION TO COMMUNITST POWERS IS THEIR INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER NATIONS. HE WAS FORCED TO BREAK IVORY COAST RELATIONS WITH USSR BECAUSE OF SUCH INTERFERENCE (1969). HE HAS NO RELATIONS WITH PRC (AND APPARENTLY LITTLE INTENTION OF ESTABLISHING THEM), AND RECENT RELATIONS WITH RUMANIA REPRESENT SEARCH FOR MARKETS RATHER THAN FOR POLITICAL GAINS. BUT HE FEARS COMMUNISTS WILL WIN OVER THE WORLD, BECAUSE WEST IS SPLIT IN SO MANY LESSER WAYS. ONLY CHANCE HE SEES FOR THE WEST IS USSR' FEAR OF PRC, WHICH MAY KEEP USSR FROM ATTACKING THE WEST. BUT WEST NEEDS DESPEARATELY TO ACHIEVE AND MAINLIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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9. VIETNAMESE AND CAMBODIAN REFUGEES: AMBASSADOR IS SEEKING TO CONVEY USG POSITON ON THESE REFUGEES TO GOIC BEFORE DEPARTING FOR DAKAR. ISSUE MAY THEREFORE ARISE AT LEVEL OF FOREIGN MINISTER USHER DURING ASST. SEC'S VISIT. ASST. SEC. MAY WISH TO RAISE IT AS WELL. THERE ARE ABOUT TWENTY CAMBODIANS AND ABOUT FIFTY VIETNAMESE HERE ON PASSPORTS OF THEIR OWN COUNTRIES. WE ARE SEEKING TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN PREFERENCES. HALF THE VIETNAMESE ARE EMPLOYED UNDER CONTRACT BY GOIC AND WILL HOPEFULLY WISH TO REAMIN. OTHERS ARE CONNECTED WITH THEIR EMBASSIES. ASST. SEC. MAY WISH TO ENCOURAGE GOIC TO OFFER ASYLUM TO THESE DIPLOMATS, AS WELL AS EMPLOYMENT POSSIBILITIES.

10. TWO KOREAS AND NAC: ROK AMBASSADOR UNABLE TO PRESENT HIS CASE TO FOREIGN MINISTER USHER UNTIL LATE NEXT WEEK AT THE SOONEST, SINCE USHER STILL OUT OF COUNTRY. THUS, AMERICAN DEMARCHE CANNOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE ASST SEC'S VISIT. SUGGEST, THEREFORE, THAT ASST SEC RAISE MATTER WITH FOREIGN MINISTER USHER. DETAILED BRIEFING ON THIS WILL BE PROVIDED IN ABIDJAN, ALTHOUGH ESSENTIALLY MATTERS HERE FALL INTO PATTERN OF LASTEST STATE CABLES ON THIS ISSUE.

11. UPPER VOLTA--MALI DISPUTE: WHILE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER ARE UNLIKELY TO RAISE THIS POINT, ASST SEC MAY WISH TO ASK THEIR VIEWS

ON THE PROSPECTS FOR SETTLEMENT. HOUPHOUET IS KNOWN TO HAVE PLAYED LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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ACTIVE BEHIND-THE-SCENES ROLE IN GETTING MEDIATION COMMMISSION STARTED UNDER EYADEMA'S CHAIRMANSHIP. HE STRONGLY SUPPORTS PEACE-FUL SETTLEMENT, BUT HIS DETAILED VIEWS UNKNOWN TO US.

12. INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY POLICY: GOIC IS ON RECORD IN FAVOROF INDEXATION. INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS, HOWEVER, BRING OUT RECOGNITION THAT THIS IS UNREALISTIC AND THAT THEIR REAL CONCERN IS TO GET WORLD RECOGNITION THAT COMMODITY PRICES MUST BE MAINTAINED

(AND STRENGTHENED) TO ALLOW RAW MATERIAL PRODUCING LDCS REASONABLE PURCHASING POWER AGAINST INCREASED COSTS OF PETROLEUM AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS. ANY ENCOURAGEMENT THAT ASST SEC CAN GIVE ON US RECOGNITION OF AND FLEXIBILITY TOWARD THIS PROBLEM WILL BE WELCOMED BY GOIC.

13. U.S. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES IN IVORY COAST: IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ASST SEC TO HAVE BRIEF BACKGROUND ON PROBLEMS OF LANG AND CONTRACT BIDS BY LOUIS BERGER (MINING RAILWAY) AND DRAVO (CIVIL WORKS AT TAABO). PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN ALL OF THESE AND MAY ALLUDE TO THEM. WE RECOMMEND THAT ASST SEC NOT INITI-ATE COMMENTS ON LANG. IF IT COMES UP HE COULD WELCOME PROPOSED FACT-FINDING AND MEDIATION EFFORTS OF DAVID MORSE AND EXPRESS HOPE FOR EARLY COMPLETION OF SUGAR REFINERY AND REASONABLE SETTLE-MENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN LANG AND SODESUCRE. ON LUUIS BERGER, ASST SEC COULD COMMEND THIS FIRM AND EXPRESS PLEASURE AT A JOINT GELGAIN-AMERICAN EFFORT AND THE HOPE THAT THE BID WILL BE FAVORABLY CON-SIDERED, FOLLOWING WHICH THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE OF SOME AMERICAN FINANCING. THIS TOTAL PROJECT COULD COST \$350 MILLION, WITH A SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF AMERICAN GOODS AND SERVICES, ON DRAVO, THE BIDS WERE JUST OPENED AND IT WAS THE CHEAPEST, ALTHOUGH IT DID NOT CONFORM TO ALL THE GOIC SPECIFICATIONS. THIS PROJECT COULD ALSO RESULT IN UP TO \$100 MILLION OF AMERICAN GOODS AND SERVICES. THE ASST SEC COULD SPEAK POSITIVELY OF DRAVO'S WORLD-WIDE RE-PUTATION AND THE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE GIVEN FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION.

14. AMERICAN CULTURAL CENTER: USIS IS CURRENTLY IN A TEMPORARY LOCATION, PENDING SELECTION OF A SITE ON WHICH TO BUILD A PERMANENT AMERICAN CULTURAL CENTER. AMBASSADOR SAW PRESIDENT LAST MAY ON THIS AND HE PORMISED TO LOOK INTO A PERMANENT SITE. SEVEN MONTHS LATER, WHEN NO ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN, AMBASSADOR SAW FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO ALSO PROMISTED TO LOOK INTO IT. IN MARCH, FOREIGN MINISTER INFORMED AMBASSADOR THAT SITE WE HAD HOPED FOR WAS UNAVAILABLE BUT THAT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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AN INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE WAS CONSIDERING SITES FOR SEVERAL DIPLOMATIC PROPERTIES AND WOULD ADVISE US SOON. ASST SEC MIGHT WISH TO RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER TO HELPPUSH FOR A DECISION. IN INTERIM WE ARE IN PROCESS OF EXTENDING LEASE ON PRESENT TEMPORARY LOCATION UNTIL NEXT SPRING.

15. INSTITUTE OF TROPICAL CARDIOLOGY: PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER HAVE EXPRESSED TO AMBASSADOR THEIR INTEREST IN US(AS WELL AS GERMAN AND SWEDISH) SUPPORT FOR A NEW INSTITUTE LINKED TO EXISTING HOSPITAL FACILITY IN ABIDJAN. WE ARE IN PROCESS OF DISCUSSING WHAT LIMITED SUPPORT U.S. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS MIGHT GIVE TO THIS AMBITIOUS SCHEME. AMBASSADOR DISCUSSED IT WITH SCI DURING FEBRUARY CONSULTATIONS AND NIH HAS BEEN ALERTED. IF IS ARISES, AST SEC MIGHT EXPRESS INTEREST AND HOPE THAT WE CAN ASSIST WITH TRAINING AND SOME TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. PRIVATE SUPPORT ALSO

POSSIBLE AND STATE DEPARTMENT WILL BE HAPPY TO LAY GROUNDWORK FOR IT IF AND WHEN IVORIAN DOCTORS AND OFFICIALS COME TO UNITED STATES TO PRESENT THEIR PLANS. NOTE WE HAVE OFFERED LEADER GRANT TO MINISTER OF HEALTH AND ASSISTANCE TO TWO DOCTORS FOR PLANNING THEIR VISIT FOR THIS PURPOSE.

16. CONCLUSION: BRIEFING PAPERS WILL BE PREPARED HERE FOR DELIVERY TO ASST SEC UPON ARIVAL ON OTHE ISSUES THAT MIGHT ARISE IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WIHT OTHER SENIOR IVORIAN OFFICIALS.
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